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Abstract:	  	  	  
	  
When	  data	  are	  made	  available	  to	  others	  to	  analyze	  for	  their	  purposes,	  steps	  must	  be	  taken	  to	  
ensure	  confidentiality,	  that	  is	  to	  prevent	  the	  identities	  of	  the	  persons	  or	  institutions	  that	  were	  
studied	  are	  not	  disclosed	  and	  cannot	  be	  deduced.	  Disclosure	  risk	  analysis	  is	  conducted	  in	  order	  
to	  create	  a	  public-­‐use	  file	  (PUF)	  from	  confidential,	  or	  restricted-­‐use,	  data.	  Based	  on	  this	  analysis	  
of	  disclosure	  risks,	  statistical	  disclosure	  limitation	  (SDL)	  methodologies	  are	  applied	  to	  the	  data	  
to	  create	  the	  PUF.	  	  
	  
The	  public-­‐use	  file	  (PUF)	  is	  the	  only	  version	  of	  the	  microdata	  to	  which	  most	  researchers	  ever	  
have	  access	  and	  the	  version	  from	  which	  much	  of	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  data	  is	  extracted.	  Therefore,	  
decisions	  made	  to	  create	  the	  PUF,	  in	  terms	  of	  variable	  changes	  (e.g.,	  deletions,	  recodes)	  and	  
the	  selection	  of	  statistical	  disclosure	  limitation	  (SDL)	  methods	  (e.g.,	  data	  swapping,	  imputation	  
collapsing	  categories)	  are	  very	  important	  and	  must	  match	  the	  key	  intended	  purposes	  of	  the	  
data	  collection	  and	  the	  disclosure	  risk.	  	  
	  
Typically,	  decisions	  regarding	  disclosure	  risk	  are	  made	  after	  data	  collection	  is	  completed.	  This	  
article	  will	  describe	  a	  new	  model	  for	  conducting	  disclosure	  risk	  analysis	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  PUFs	  
that	  moves	  decisions	  regarding	  disclosure	  risk	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  survey	  research	  process.	  
Early	  thinking	  and	  decision-­‐making	  regarding	  disclosure	  risk	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  more	  analytically	  
useful	  PUF	  and	  the	  most	  optimal	  set	  of	  data	  products	  that	  can	  be	  developed	  (tables,	  maps,	  
online	  analysis,	  and	  so	  on,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  PUF).	  Efficiencies	  created	  between	  the	  various	  
stages	  of	  the	  research	  process	  by	  the	  model	  will	  shorten	  the	  time	  between	  data	  collection	  and	  
data	  release,	  thus	  increasing	  the	  value	  of	  the	  shared	  data	  to	  secondary	  analysts	  and	  to	  science.	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Description	  of	  the	  current	  process	  	  
	  
Standard	  practice	  for	  creating	  new	  public-­‐use	  files	  (PUFs)	  is	  for	  disclosure	  risk	  analysis	  (DRA)	  to	  
be	  conducted	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  survey	  research	  process,	  after	  data	  are	  collected.	  This	  requires	  
that	  data	  cleaning	  and	  editing	  be	  completed.	  By	  this	  time,	  several	  publications	  may	  also	  be	  
have	  been	  completed	  and	  released,	  which	  may	  pose	  dangers	  of	  deductive	  disclosure	  of	  
identities.	  	  
	  
Often,	  different	  organizations	  or	  groups	  within	  the	  same	  organization	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  
various	  steps	  of	  survey	  design,	  data	  collection,	  disclosure	  analysis,	  PUF	  preparation,	  and	  data	  
dissemination.	  This	  can	  create	  specialization,	  or	  efficiency,	  in	  the	  process.	  One	  issue	  that	  
creates	  inefficiency	  and	  disconnection,	  however,	  is	  thinking	  of	  each	  survey	  step	  as	  unrelated	  to	  
the	  other	  steps	  in	  terms	  of	  disclosure	  risk	  and	  the	  final	  PUF	  content.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Prior	  to	  the	  late	  1970’s,	  PUF	  creation	  included	  the	  removal	  of	  direct	  identifiers	  such	  as	  name,	  
record	  identifiers,	  and	  social	  security	  numbers.	  Subsequently,	  several	  factors	  led	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  disclosure	  analysis	  as	  a	  field	  and	  science,	  including	  advancements	  in	  computing	  
technology;	  increasingly	  inexpensive	  data	  storage;	  the	  expansion	  of	  survey	  research	  and	  
correspondingly,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  availability	  of	  data	  about	  individuals	  and	  organizations;	  
public	  demand	  for	  data;	  and	  the	  desire	  and	  ability	  to	  link	  data	  across	  systems.	  These	  factors	  
combined	  to	  progressively	  increase	  disclosure	  risk	  and	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  SDL	  
techniques	  to	  reduce	  such	  risk	  (see	  Fienberg,	  1985).	  	  
	  
Disclosure	  risk	  and	  analysis	  has	  not	  previously	  been	  fully	  considered	  until	  after	  data	  collection	  is	  
completed	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  disclosure	  analysis	  being	  relatively	  new	  to	  social	  research.	  
Therefore,	  this	  step	  has	  been	  added	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  process,	  even	  when	  a	  PUF	  is	  planned	  at	  
the	  time	  of	  proposal	  development.	  Similarly,	  though	  PUF	  creation	  may	  be	  an	  ultimate	  goal,	  the	  
survey	  model	  has	  remained	  substantially	  linear,	  to	  match	  the	  steps	  of	  questionnaire	  design,	  
data	  collection,	  data	  cleaning	  and	  editing,	  and	  data	  release.	  	  
	  
Description	  of	  Disclosure	  Analysis	  
	  
Disclosure	  analysis	  is	  now	  typically	  considered	  a	  fundamental	  step	  in	  the	  protection	  human	  
subjects.	  For	  the	  social	  and	  behavioral	  sciences,	  disclosure	  analysis	  extends	  and	  ensures	  the	  
promises	  made	  during	  informed	  consent	  procedures.	  For	  the	  medical	  sciences,	  disclosure	  
analysis	  provides	  a	  route	  to	  data	  when	  other	  provisions	  in	  the	  Health	  Insurance	  Portability	  and	  
Accountability	  Act	  (HIPAA),	  such	  as	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  18	  variables	  specified	  by	  HIPAA	  to	  create	  
a	  deidentified	  dataset,	  are	  insufficient.	  
	  
Disclosure	  analysis	  involves	  the	  careful	  examination	  of	  indirect	  identifiers	  that	  pose	  the	  risk	  re-­‐
identification	  of	  a	  respondent	  (O’Rourke,	  2003)	  and	  publicly	  available	  databases	  that	  could	  be	  
used	  to	  link	  data,	  and	  thus	  enable	  one	  to	  deduce	  identities.	  	  	  
	  
Optimally,	  a	  disclosure	  analysis	  begins	  by	  answering	  the	  question	  “What	  are	  the	  key	  analytic	  
uses	  of	  this	  data	  collection?”	  Based	  on	  this	  assessment,	  decisions	  are	  made	  to	  modify	  the	  data	  
3	  
	  
in	  order	  to	  create	  the	  PUF.	  Modifications	  may	  include	  combining	  categories	  or	  removing	  
variables	  altogether	  due	  to	  their	  sensitivity	  and	  therefore,	  the	  risk	  of	  respondent	  re-­‐
identification.	  Reasons	  that	  variables	  are	  removed	  altogether	  from	  a	  file	  include	  that	  they	  are	  
highly	  sensitive	  and	  potentially	  identifying	  (e.g.,	  sexual	  orientation)	  or	  that	  they	  are	  both	  
sensitive	  and	  had	  a	  low	  or	  moderate	  response	  rate	  (i.e.,	  low	  utility).	  Examples	  of	  SDL	  techniques	  
applied	  to	  files	  to	  protect	  the	  data	  include	  coarsening	  (U.S.	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Census,	  2003),	  data	  
swapping	  (Feinberg	  and	  McIntyre,	  2005),	  imputation	  [citation],	  multiple	  imputation	  [Drechsler	  
and	  Reiter,	  2010],	  and	  microaggregation	  [citation].	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  disclosure	  risks	  as	  well	  as	  
methods	  used	  to	  protect	  against	  risks,	  see	  Federal	  Committee	  on	  Statistical	  Methodology	  
(2005).	  	  
	  
Regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  decisions	  made	  regarding	  the	  public-­‐use	  data	  file,	  O’Rourke,	  et.	  al	  
(2006)	  state:	  
	  
“The	  public-­‐use	  version	  of	  the	  data	  is	  very	  important	  because	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  
only	  one	  to	  which	  most	  researchers,	  policy	  analysts,	  teaching	  faculty,	  and	  
students	  will	  ever	  have	  access.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  the	  version	  from	  which	  much	  of	  the	  
utility	  of	  the	  data	  is	  extracted	  and	  often	  it	  effectively	  becomes	  the	  historical	  
record	  of	  the	  data	  collection.	  Large	  national	  studies	  containing	  thousands	  of	  
variables	  are	  often	  not,	  nor	  are	  they	  necessarily	  intended	  to	  be,	  very	  thoroughly	  
analyzed	  prior	  to	  their	  public	  release.	  At	  most,	  a	  detailed	  report	  or	  series	  of	  
tables	  are	  sometimes	  released	  ahead	  of	  the	  microdata.	  The	  data	  are	  
subsequently	  used	  for	  research,	  policy,	  and	  teaching	  purposes	  in	  the	  years	  after	  
their	  release,	  and	  even	  decades	  later	  for	  comparative	  analysis.	  For	  these	  
reasons,	  great	  care	  must	  be	  taken	  to	  create	  a	  public-­‐use	  version	  of	  a	  data	  
collection	  that	  truly	  does	  balance	  utility	  and	  risk.	  Those	  creating	  public	  use	  files	  
must	  ensure	  they	  have	  identified	  and	  retained	  intended	  uses	  of	  the	  data	  and	  yet	  
accurately	  defined	  and	  fully	  addressed	  risk.”	  
	  
The	  following	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  demographic	  variable	  –	  whether	  the	  respondent	  served	  in	  the	  
military	  –that	  might	  be	  collapsed	  by	  eliminating	  detail	  such	  as	  period	  of	  military	  service:	  
	  
• Period	  or	  place	  of	  military	  service	  
o World	  War	  II	  
o Between	  WWII	  and	  Korea	  
o Korea	  
o Between	  Korea	  and	  Vietnam	  
o Vietnam	  
o Between	  Vietnam	  and	  Gulf	  War	  
o Gulf	  War	  






For	  the	  PUF,	  the	  detail	  for	  military	  service,	  due	  to	  disclosure	  risk,	  might	  be	  collapsed	  to:	  	  	  
	  




Of	  note	  is	  that	  future	  uses	  of	  data	  are	  difficult	  to	  determine	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  disclosure	  
analysis.	  For	  example,	  data	  about	  veterans	  with	  service	  prior	  to	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  can	  be	  
used	  for	  comparative	  analysis	  to	  veterans	  with	  contemporary	  military	  service.	  These	  
comparisons	  might	  include	  the	  nature	  of	  differences	  in	  the	  impact	  of	  military	  service,	  as	  well	  as	  
duration	  and	  severity	  of	  impacts.	  	  However,	  the	  specificity	  regarding	  period	  or	  place	  of	  service	  
is	  often	  removed	  from	  PUFs.	  Prior	  to	  the	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  wars,	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  type	  
of	  analysis	  was	  perhaps	  not	  anticipated.	  When	  a	  particular	  and	  salient	  need	  arises,	  it	  is	  difficult	  
for	  the	  data	  community	  to	  quickly	  respond,	  such	  as	  determining	  existing	  data	  that	  could	  
provide	  answers	  to	  current	  questions.	  Moreover,	  when	  data	  are	  removed	  from	  the	  PUF,	  unless	  
researchers	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  original	  data	  collection	  or	  take	  the	  extra	  step	  to	  examine	  the	  
questionnaire	  and	  other	  survey	  instruments,	  if	  they	  are	  publicly	  available,	  they	  will	  not	  realize	  
that	  certain	  questions	  and	  response	  categories	  were	  asked	  of	  respondents	  but	  that	  those	  
variables	  were	  withheld	  from	  the	  PUF.	  	  
	  
Other	  examples	  of	  sensitive	  variables	  that	  may	  be	  altered	  include	  (1)	  lesbian,	  gay,	  bisexual,	  and	  
transgender	  (LGBT)	  codes	  that	  are	  collapsed	  to	  a	  single,	  dichotomous	  LGBT	  category,	  or	  
depending	  on	  frequencies	  and	  disclosure	  risk,	  removed	  from	  the	  file	  (2)	  race	  codes	  such	  as	  
white,	  black,	  American	  Indian,	  Asian,	  Pacific	  Islander,	  and	  other	  race	  that	  are	  recoded	  to	  white,	  
black,	  and	  other	  (3)	  ethnicity	  codes	  such	  as	  Mexican,	  Cuban,	  Chicano,	  Mexican	  American,	  Other	  
Spanish	  that	  are	  transformed	  to	  a	  single,	  dichotomous	  Hispanic	  code	  and	  (4)	  continuous	  years	  
of	  education,	  training,	  and	  other	  schooling	  that	  is	  coarsened	  to	  broad	  categories.	  These	  
alterations	  to	  a	  datafile	  have	  different	  implications,	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  desired	  statistical	  
analysis	  (e.g.,	  cross-­‐tabulations,	  means,	  regression)	  and	  content	  of	  the	  analysis	  (e.g.,	  
differences	  among	  sub-­‐populations).	  	  
	  
Often,	  a	  single	  variable	  or	  small	  group	  of	  variables	  alone	  do	  not	  pose	  a	  risk.	  It	  is	  when	  the	  
variables	  are	  combined	  with	  geographic	  variables	  that	  disclosure	  risk	  becomes	  of	  concern.	  This	  
is	  because,	  typically,	  to	  identify	  a	  respondent,	  one	  begins	  by	  narrowing	  the	  search	  to	  a	  
geographic	  location.	  For	  example,	  detailed	  health	  or	  mental	  health	  diagnostic	  codes	  alone	  may	  
not	  be	  problematic	  but	  when	  they	  are	  combined	  with	  detailed	  geography,	  such	  as	  county	  or	  
primary	  metropolitan	  statistical	  area	  (PMSA),	  as	  well	  as	  demographic	  data	  such	  as	  age,	  race,	  
ethnicity,	  marital	  status,	  and	  number	  of	  children	  it	  becomes	  easier	  to	  isolate	  cases.	  This	  
problem	  is	  magnified	  by	  the	  collection	  of	  data	  for	  multiple	  persons	  per	  household.	  Geographic	  
data	  may	  also	  be	  problematic	  when	  common	  variables	  are	  available	  for	  data	  linkage	  across	  two	  
datasets,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1.	  Each	  file	  may	  have	  low	  disclosure	  risk	  but	  when	  combined	  using	  
common	  variables	  between	  the	  files,	  they	  create	  a	  superset	  of	  variables	  with	  high	  disclosure	  




	   	  
Figure	  1.	  	  
	  
Data	  linkage	  between	  non-­‐sensitive	  and	  sensitive	  data	  with	  varying	  geographic	  specificity	  and	  




Depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  risk,	  disclosure	  analysis	  may	  examine	  risk,	  both	  within	  the	  sample	  and	  
within	  the	  population.	  For	  characteristics	  that	  can	  be	  known,	  or	  observed,	  such	  as	  
demographics,	  Census	  and	  other	  publicly	  available	  data	  can	  be	  used	  to	  determine	  population	  
denominators.	  This	  usually	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  robust	  PUF.	  
	  
A	  record	  may	  be	  unique	  in	  the	  sample	  but	  not	  in	  the	  population.	  For	  example,	  a	  record	  in	  a	  
study	  may	  include	  a	  pregnant	  Hispanic	  veteran	  in	  Milwaukee	  and	  this	  may	  be	  the	  only	  record	  
with	  these	  characteristics	  in	  this	  geographic	  location.	  However,	  given	  the	  timeframe	  of	  the	  
study	  and	  using	  Census	  data,	  it	  could	  be	  determined	  that	  there	  were	  many	  pregnant	  Hispanic	  
veterans	  in	  Milwaukee	  and	  therefore,	  that	  the	  single	  record	  in	  the	  sample	  was	  not	  a	  disclosure	  
risk.	  Therefore,	  the	  record	  could	  be	  determined	  to	  be	  of	  low	  (acceptable)	  risk	  because	  it	  was	  
selected	  from	  among	  many	  similar	  records	  within	  the	  population	  yet	  be	  the	  only	  record	  of	  its	  
kind	  within	  the	  sample.	  	  
	  
Conversely,	  a	  study	  may	  sample	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  under	  examination	  (e.g.,	  
people	  in	  a	  rural	  region	  affected	  by	  a	  health	  condition).	  Study	  participants	  may	  be	  known	  to	  
each	  other	  (e.g.,	  most	  participants	  were	  treated	  at	  the	  same	  specialty	  health	  facility),	  thus	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creating	  high	  disclosure	  risk.	  Certain	  sampling	  designs,	  such	  as	  snowball	  designs,	  create	  unique	  
disclosure	  risks.	  With	  snowball	  designs,	  study	  participants	  are	  asked	  whether	  they	  know	  others	  
with	  characteristics	  that	  fit	  the	  study’s	  definitional	  criteria.	  The	  The	  fact	  that	  respondents	  may	  
know	  each	  other	  must	  be	  factored	  	  
	  
Uneven	  treatment	  of	  data	  	  
	  
Alterations	  to	  the	  data	  may	  disproportionately	  affect	  certain	  sub-­‐populations	  regarding	  the	  
release	  of	  variables	  and	  response	  codes	  on	  the	  PUF.	  The	  uneven	  treatment	  of	  variables	  is	  due	  
to	  some	  variables	  making	  records	  stand	  out	  in	  a	  data	  collection	  and	  thereby,	  increasing	  
disclosure	  risk	  for	  respondents.	  This	  may	  include	  any	  sensitive	  variables,	  such	  detailed	  race	  and	  
ethnicity.	  Geographic	  data	  are	  frequently	  coarsened	  due	  to	  disclosure	  risk.	  However,	  these	  
types	  of	  data	  provide	  the	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  broader	  topic	  under	  study	  in	  which	  
researchers	  are	  often	  the	  most	  interested.	  	  
	  
A	  particular	  problem	  with	  coarsening	  race	  and	  ethnicity	  codes	  is	  that	  disclosure	  protections	  are	  
often	  applied	  to	  all	  records,	  though	  risk	  may	  be	  localized.	  This	  can	  lead	  to	  detailed	  race	  and	  
ethnicity	  codes	  being	  grouped	  together	  (e.g.,	  white,	  black,	  other).	  However,	  when	  disclosure	  
risk	  is	  considered	  in	  a	  nuanced	  manner,	  more	  detailed	  data	  can	  typically	  be	  retained	  on	  the	  
PUF.	  This	  provides	  researchers	  the	  ability	  to	  fully	  analyze	  and	  explain	  the	  data	  and	  distinctions	  
within	  it.	  The	  blunting	  of	  codes	  impacts	  every	  type	  of	  research	  (e.g.,	  health	  disparities)	  due	  to	  
with	  withholding	  of	  geographic	  data,	  race	  and	  ethnicity	  codes	  and	  other	  types	  of	  demographic	  
data.	  This	  issue	  is	  perhaps	  best	  understood	  with	  an	  example.	  	  
	  
When	  considering	  risk	  for	  unique	  records	  in	  a	  national	  file,	  the	  risk	  for	  Asian	  Americans	  will	  
appear	  different	  depending	  on	  whether	  one	  considers	  the	  distribution	  of	  this	  group	  as	  a	  whole	  
or	  at	  a	  detailed	  level.	  As	  shown	  in	  Table	  1,	  the	  racial	  category	  “Asian	  alone”	  represent	  4.8	  
percent	  of	  the	  U.S.	  population.	  As	  shown	  in	  Table	  2,	  three	  sub-­‐groups	  within	  the	  “Asian	  alone”	  
category	  include	  about	  half	  (46%)	  of	  the	  “Asian	  alone”	  population,	  as	  follows:	  Asian	  Indian	  
(.9%),	  Filipino	  (.8%),	  and	  Vietnamese	  (.5%).	  Given	  the	  cultural	  differences	  within	  these	  sub-­‐
groups,	  retaining	  the	  detail	  for	  race	  /	  ethnicity	  could	  provide	  a	  great	  enhanced	  public-­‐use	  file,	  if	  






Subject	   Number	   Percent	  
Total	  population	  (all	  races)	   308,745,538	   100.00%	  
WHITE	   	  	   	  	  
	  	  White	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	  [1]	   231,040,398	   74.83%	  
	  	  	  	  White	  alone	   223,553,265	   72.41%	  
	  	  	  	  White	  in	  combination	   7,487,133	   2.43%	  
	  	  Not	  White	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	   77,705,140	   25.17%	  
BLACK	  OR	  AFRICAN	  AMERICAN	   	  	   	  	  
	  	  Black	  or	  African	  American	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	  [1]	   42,020,743	   13.61%	  
	  	  	  	  Black	  or	  African	  American	  alone	   38,929,319	   12.61%	  
	  	  	  	  Black	  or	  African	  American	  in	  combination	   3,091,424	   1.00%	  
	  	  Not	  Black	  or	  African	  American	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	   266,724,795	   86.39%	  
AMERICAN	  INDIAN	  AND	  ALASKA	  NATIVE	   	  	   	  	  
	  	  American	  Indian	  and	  Alaska	  Native	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	  [1]	   5,220,579	   1.69%	  
	  	  	  	  American	  Indian	  and	  Alaska	  Native	  alone	   2,932,248	   0.95%	  
	  	  	  	  American	  Indian	  and	  Alaska	  Native	  in	  combination	   2,288,331	   0.74%	  
	  	  Not	  American	  Indian	  and	  Alaska	  Native	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	   303,524,959	   98.31%	  
ASIAN	   	  	   	  	  
	  	  Asian	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	  [1]	   17,320,856	   5.61%	  
	  	  	  	  Asian	  alone	   14,674,252	   4.75%	  
	  	  	  	  Asian	  in	  combination	   2,646,604	   0.86%	  
	  	  Not	  Asian	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	   291,424,682	   94.39%	  
NATIVE	  HAWAIIAN	  AND	  OTHER	  PACIFIC	  ISLANDER	   	  	   	  	  
	  	  Native	  Hawaiian	  and	  Other	  Pacific	  Islander	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	  [1]	   1,225,195	   0.40%	  
	  	  	  	  Native	  Hawaiian	  and	  Other	  Pacific	  Islander	  alone	   540,013	   0.17%	  
	  	  	  	  Native	  Hawaiian	  and	  Other	  Pacific	  Islander	  in	  combination	   685,182	   0.22%	  
	  	  Not	  Native	  Hawaiian	  and	  Other	  Pacific	  Islander	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	   307,520,343	   99.60%	  
SOME	  OTHER	  RACE	   	  	   	  	  
	  	  Some	  Other	  Race	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	  [1]	   21,748,084	   7.04%	  
	  	  	  	  Some	  Other	  Race	  alone	   19,107,368	   6.19%	  
	  	  	  	  Some	  Other	  Race	  in	  combination	   2,640,716	   0.86%	  
	  	  Not	  Some	  Other	  Race	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	   286,997,454	   92.96%	  




































[1]	  The	  race	  concept	  "alone	  or	  in	  combination"	  includes	  people	  who	  reported	  a	  single	  race	  alone	  (e.g.,	  Asian)	  and	  people	  
who	  reported	  that	  race	  in	  combination	  with	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  other	  race	  groups	  (i.e.,	  White,	  Black	  or	  African	  American,	  
American	  Indian	  and	  Alaska	  Native,	  Native	  Hawaiian	  and	  Other	  Pacific	  Islander,	  and	  Some	  Other	  Race).	  The	  "alone	  or	  in	  
combination"	  concept,	  therefore,	  represents	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  people	  who	  reported	  as	  that	  race	  group,	  either	  
alone,	  or	  in	  combination	  with	  another	  race(s).	  The	  sum	  of	  the	  six	  individual	  race	  "alone	  or	  in	  combination"	  categories	  may	  
add	  to	  more	  than	  the	  total	  population	  because	  people	  who	  reported	  more	  than	  one	  race	  are	  tallied	  in	  each	  race	  category.	  
	  	   	  	  
	   	  	   	  	  
Source:	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau,	  2010	  Census.	   	  	   	  	  
Summary	  File	  1,	  Tables	  P3	  and	  P6.	   	  	  
	  








TABLE	  2.	  Asian	  Alone	  by	  Selected	  Groups	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  	   United	  States	   PERCENT	  U.S.	   PERCENT	  ASIAN	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   Estimate	   POPULATION	   POPULATION	  
TOTAL	   U.S.	  POPULATION	   	  	   308,745,538	   100.0%	   	  -­‐-­‐	  
	  	   ASIAN	  ALONE	  	   	  	   14,727,806	   4.8%	   100.0%	  
	  	  Asian	  Indian	   2,765,155	   0.9%	   18.8%	  
	  	  Bangladeshi	   115,037	   0.0%	   0.8%	  
	  	  Cambodian	   264,080	   0.1%	   1.8%	  
	  	  Chinese	  ,	  except	  Taiwanese	   3,291,388	   1.1%	   22.3%	  
	  	  Filipino	   2,512,686	   0.8%	   17.1%	  
	  	  Hmong	   245,807	   0.1%	   1.7%	  
	  	  Indonesian	   77,104	   0.0%	   0.5%	  
	  	  Japanese	   774,104	   0.3%	   5.3%	  
	  	  Korean	   1,456,076	   0.5%	   9.9%	  
	  	  Laotian	   210,571	   0.1%	   1.4%	  
	  	  Malaysian	   20,438	   0.0%	   0.1%	  
	  	  Pakistani	   356,939	   0.1%	   2.4%	  
	  	  Sri	  Lankan	   40,285	   0.0%	   0.3%	  
	  	  Taiwanese	   165,524	   0.1%	   1.1%	  
	  	  Thai	   177,445	   0.1%	   1.2%	  
	  	  Vietnamese	   1,625,365	   0.5%	   11.0%	  
	  	  Other	  Asian	   496,039	   0.2%	   3.4%	  
	  	  Other	  Asian,	  not	  specified	   133,763	   0.0%	   0.9%	  
	  	   	  
2010	  American	  Community	  Survey	  1-­‐Year	  
Estimates,	  ACS	  Table	  BO2006	  
Universe:	  Total	  Asian	  alone	  population	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   Although	  the	  American	  Community	  Survey	  (ACS)	  produces	  population,	  demographic	  and	  housing	  unit	  
estimates,	  for	  2010,	  the	  2010	  Census	  provides	  the	  official	  counts	  of	  the	  population	  and	  housing	  units	  for	  the	  
nation,	  states,	  counties,	  cities	  and	  towns.	  
Total	  includes	  people	  who	  reported	  Asian	  only,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  reported	  one	  or	  more	  detailed	  
Asian	  groups.	  
Other	  Asian.	  Includes	  people	  who	  provided	  a	  response	  of	  another	  Asian	  group	  (such	  as	  Burmese);	  and	  includes	  
people	  who	  provided	  multiple	  Asian	  responses.	  
Other	  Asian,	  not	  specified.	  Includes	  people	  who	  answered	  the	  "Other	  Asian"	  response	  category	  and	  did	  not	  
provide	  a	  specific	  group;	  and	  includes	  people	  who	  provided	  only	  a	  generic	  term	  such	  as	  "Asian."	  
While	  the	  2010	  American	  Community	  Survey	  (ACS)	  data	  generally	  reflect	  the	  December	  2009	  Office	  of	  
Management	  and	  Budget	  (OMB)	  definitions	  of	  metropolitan	  and	  micropolitan	  statistical	  areas;	  in	  certain	  
instances	  the	  names,	  codes,	  and	  boundaries	  of	  the	  principal	  cities	  shown	  in	  ACS	  tables	  may	  differ	  from	  the	  
OMB	  definitions	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  effective	  dates	  of	  the	  geographic	  entities.	  	  
Estimates	  of	  urban	  and	  rural	  population,	  housing	  units,	  and	  characteristics	  reflect	  boundaries	  of	  urban	  areas	  
defined	  based	  on	  Census	  2000	  data.	  Boundaries	  for	  urban	  areas	  have	  not	  been	  updated	  since	  Census	  2000.	  As	  
a	  result,	  data	  for	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas	  from	  the	  ACS	  do	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  the	  results	  of	  ongoing	  
urbanization.	  
Source:	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau,	  2010	  American	  Community	  Survey	  
Explanation	  of	  Symbols:	  
	  	  	  	  1.	  	  An	  '**'	  entry	  in	  the	  margin	  of	  error	  column	  indicates	  that	  either	  no	  sample	  observations	  or	  too	  few	  
sample	  observations	  were	  available	  to	  compute	  a	  standard	  error	  and	  thus	  the	  margin	  of	  error.	  A	  statistical	  test	  
is	  not	  appropriate.	  
	  	  	  	  2.	  	  An	  '-­‐'	  entry	  in	  the	  estimate	  column	  indicates	  that	  either	  no	  sample	  observations	  or	  too	  few	  sample	  
observations	  were	  available	  to	  compute	  an	  estimate,	  or	  a	  ratio	  of	  medians	  cannot	  be	  calculated	  because	  one	  
or	  both	  of	  the	  median	  estimates	  falls	  in	  the	  lowest	  interval	  or	  upper	  interval	  of	  an	  open-­‐ended	  distribution.	  
	  	  	  	  3.	  	  An	  '-­‐'	  following	  a	  median	  estimate	  means	  the	  median	  falls	  in	  the	  lowest	  interval	  of	  an	  open-­‐ended	  
distribution.	  
	  	  	  	  4.	  	  An	  '+'	  following	  a	  median	  estimate	  means	  the	  median	  falls	  in	  the	  upper	  interval	  of	  an	  open-­‐ended	  
distribution.	  	  
	  	  	  5.	  	  An	  '***'	  entry	  in	  the	  margin	  of	  error	  column	  indicates	  that	  the	  median	  falls	  in	  the	  lowest	  interval	  or	  upper	  
interval	  of	  an	  open-­‐ended	  distribution.	  A	  statistical	  test	  is	  not	  appropriate.	  
	  	  	  	  6.	  	  An	  '*****'	  entry	  in	  the	  margin	  of	  error	  column	  indicates	  that	  the	  estimate	  is	  controlled.	  A	  statistical	  test	  
for	  sampling	  variability	  is	  not	  appropriate.	  
	  	  	  	  7.	  	  An	  'N'	  entry	  in	  the	  estimate	  and	  margin	  of	  error	  columns	  indicates	  that	  data	  for	  this	  geographic	  area	  
cannot	  be	  displayed	  because	  the	  number	  of	  sample	  cases	  is	  too	  small.	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Depending	  on	  how	  the	  altered	  variables	  are	  treated	  for	  the	  PUF,	  certain	  types	  of	  analyses	  may	  
be	  precluded.	  For	  example,	  categorization	  prevents	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  measures	  of	  central	  
tendency,	  such	  as	  means,	  whereas	  data	  swapping	  and	  imputation	  preserve	  this	  ability.	  	  
	  
While	  restricted-­‐use	  versions	  of	  data	  are	  available	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  requirements	  and	  
application	  procedures	  for	  accessing	  them	  are	  often	  stringent.	  Restricted-­‐use	  data	  are	  available	  
via	  licensing	  agreements	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  online	  data	  analysis	  and	  virtual	  data	  systems,	  such	  
as	  those	  provided	  by	  ICPSR	  and	  the	  National	  Organization	  for	  Research	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  (NORC).	  Most	  data	  collections	  do	  not	  have	  both	  public-­‐use	  and	  restricted-­‐use	  versions	  
available.	  Typically,	  the	  only	  file	  version	  available	  to	  researchers	  other	  than	  the	  original	  
investigator	  is	  the	  PUF.2	  Of	  ICPSR’s	  7,567	  data	  collections,	  6,573	  collections	  (87%)	  are	  public-­‐use	  
only;	  800	  (10.5%)	  are	  restricted-­‐use	  (entire	  data	  collection	  is	  restricted)	  and	  194	  (2.5%)	  have	  
both	  restricted-­‐	  and	  public-­‐use	  versions	  of	  the	  data.	  	  
	  
A	  New	  Model	  
	  
A	  model	  for	  conducting	  disclosure	  analysis	  that	  moves	  disclosure	  risk	  considerations	  to	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  survey	  design,	  rather	  than	  waiting	  until	  data	  collection	  is	  finished,	  will	  create	  
efficiencies	  throughout	  the	  survey	  process,	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  for	  a	  more	  robust	  set	  of	  data	  
products	  to	  be	  released.	  Moving	  this	  analysis	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  survey	  design	  optimizes	  
the	  development	  and	  release	  of	  data	  products	  because	  it	  forces	  planning	  and	  decision-­‐making	  
to	  a	  stage	  in	  the	  survey	  process	  prior	  to	  any	  data	  or	  information	  release.	  Therefore,	  decisions	  
are	  made	  prior	  to	  any	  type	  of	  release	  that	  could	  prevent	  the	  most	  optimal	  set	  of	  data	  products	  
from	  being	  developed.	  	  
	  
Any	  information	  released	  regarding	  a	  data	  collection	  must	  be	  factored	  into	  a	  disclosure	  
analysis,	  even	  when	  the	  error	  is	  mitigated	  	  (i.e.,	  an	  unintended	  release	  of	  map	  showing	  the	  
primary	  sampling	  units	  (PSUs),	  or	  data	  collection	  sites,	  that	  is	  eventually	  removed).	  The	  release	  
must	  continue	  to	  be	  considered	  because	  it	  is	  unknown	  how	  many	  people	  read,	  downloaded,	  
copied,	  forwarded,	  or	  saved	  the	  information.	  Some	  types	  of	  data	  releases	  cannot	  be	  mitigated,	  
such	  a	  table	  of	  sample	  sizes	  by	  PSU	  published	  in	  a	  professional	  journal.	  Publishing	  PSU	  maps	  
and	  sample	  sizes	  by	  geographic	  area	  typically	  lend	  little	  to	  analysis	  but	  rather	  are	  used	  for	  
descriptive	  purposes.	  Both	  of	  these	  practices	  increase	  disclosure	  risk	  by	  pinpointing	  geographic	  
areas	  and	  sample	  size	  characteristics	  based	  on	  geography,	  usually	  without	  analytic	  benefit.	  It	  is	  
critical	  to	  consider	  all	  disclosure	  risks	  and	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  information	  prior	  to	  publishing	  any	  
data	  products	  based	  on	  geography.	  	  
	  
The	  disclosure	  analysis	  must	  take	  into	  account	  that	  any	  information	  publicly	  released	  prior	  to	  
the	  disclosure	  analysis	  can	  be	  combined	  with	  the	  PUF	  or	  other	  data	  products	  and	  potentially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Some	  data	  can	  only	  be	  released	  in	  restricted-­‐use	  format.	  Examples	  include	  surveys	  or	  variables	  that	  
geographically	  pinpoint	  respondents	  or	  include	  enough	  detail	  about	  respondents,	  along	  with	  geographic	  
information,	  to	  create	  high	  disclosure	  risk.	  One	  such	  example	  might	  include	  surveys	  of	  disaster	  survivors.	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put	  respondents	  at	  risk.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  it	  is	  optimal	  to	  consider	  the	  disclosure	  risk	  resulting	  
from	  all	  data	  products	  that	  will	  be	  publicly	  released	  from	  a	  given	  data	  collection	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  survey,	  proposal,	  or	  request	  for	  proposal	  (RFP)	  development.	  Data	  products	  
may	  include	  publications,	  maps,	  tables,	  estimates,	  online	  analysis	  files,	  and	  public-­‐use	  datafiles.	  
If	  longitudinal	  follow-­‐ups	  are	  planned,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  funded	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  disclosure	  
analysis	  but	  are	  desired	  and	  might	  be	  conducted,	  the	  risk	  presented	  by	  these	  additional	  data	  
can	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  using	  this	  model.	  The	  model	  will	  facilitate	  the	  release	  of	  the	  
longitudinal	  data	  once	  they	  are	  collected,	  without	  penalty	  for	  having	  released	  earlier	  waves	  of	  
data.	  	  
This	  model	  consists	  of	  three	  steps:	  (1)	  Identify	  disclosure	  risks	  early	  (2)	  Adjust	  survey	  design,	  
including	  the	  sample	  size,	  if	  desired	  (3)	  Identify	  preliminary	  statistical	  disclosure	  limitation	  (SDL)	  
methodologies.	  	  
	  
Identify	  disclosure	  risks	  (early)	  
	  
Once	  the	  questionnaire	  and	  survey	  design	  take	  shape,	  disclosure	  analysis	  can	  begin	  because	  
disclosure	  analysis	  starts	  with	  a	  few	  fundamental	  determinations,	  including:	  	  
	  
• Key	  analytic	  uses	  
• Sensitive	  variables	  
• Unique	  risks	  
• Inherent	  disclosure	  protections	  (e.g.,	  self-­‐report	  data,	  recall	  error)3	  	  
	  
Even	  preliminary	  data	  are	  not	  required	  for	  the	  above	  determinations	  to	  be	  made	  and	  for	  
disclosure	  risk	  assessment	  to	  begin.	  Next,	  a	  preliminary	  report	  regarding	  risk	  can	  be	  completed,	  
taking	  all	  data	  collection	  and	  planned	  releases	  into	  account.	  After	  the	  data	  are	  collected,	  final	  
determinations	  regarding	  risk	  and	  SDL	  techniques	  can	  be	  agreed	  upon	  and	  the	  PUF	  created.	  	  
	  
Adjust	  survey	  design	  	  
	  
During	  the	  design	  stage,	  needed	  samples	  for	  given	  variables	  are	  determined	  for	  estimation	  and	  
analysis.	  Examples	  of	  these	  variables	  are	  age,	  race,	  and	  gender.	  	  Expected	  distributions	  for	  
these	  sub-­‐groups	  by	  key	  analysis	  variables	  are	  examined	  to	  ensure	  sufficient	  samples	  during	  
data	  collection.	  	  
	  
If	  questions	  regarding	  disclosure	  risk	  are	  also	  considered	  at	  this	  point,	  the	  survey	  could	  be	  of	  
greater	  utility	  and	  resources	  better	  directed.	  For	  example,	  disclosure	  risk	  is	  often	  created	  by	  
indirect	  variables,	  taken	  together,	  along	  with	  geographic	  variables	  that	  create	  unique	  records.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Survey	  questions	  or	  techniques	  requiring	  self-­‐report	  and	  recall	  provide	  inherent	  disclosure	  protections	  because	  
they	  add	  a	  measure	  of	  error	  to	  the	  data.	  Respondents	  are	  known	  to	  under-­‐	  or	  over-­‐report	  behavioral	  data,	  
depending	  on	  social	  desirability	  (self-­‐report	  data)	  (e.g.,	  how	  many	  religious	  services	  did	  you	  attend	  in	  the	  last	  3	  
months?)	  (Citation).	  Also,	  when	  asking	  respondents	  to	  recall	  an	  event	  of	  an	  earlier	  period,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  range	  of	  
accuracy	  in	  responses	  (recall	  error)	  (Citation).	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Examples	  of	  indirect	  variables	  include	  characteristics	  about	  a	  person	  that	  can	  be	  known,	  such	  as	  
age,	  gender,	  ethnicity,	  education,	  number	  of	  children,	  and	  marital	  status.	  Such	  records	  may	  be	  
unique	  in	  the	  sample	  and	  also	  within	  the	  population.	  	  
	  
SDL	  methods	  that	  tend	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  robust	  PUF,	  and	  that	  can	  work	  well	  with	  disclosure	  
risk	  created	  by	  unique	  records,	  include	  data	  swapping	  and	  multiple	  imputation.	  These	  methods,	  
compared	  to	  methods	  such	  as	  coarsening	  categories,	  allow	  a	  broader	  array	  of	  analyses	  for	  the	  
PUF.	  However,	  data	  swapping	  and	  multiple	  imputation	  require	  a	  suitable	  number	  of	  like	  records	  
for	  the	  method	  to	  be	  implemented.	  Reiter	  and	  Drechsler	  (2010)	  have	  suggested	  Sampling	  with	  
Synthesis	  whereby	  multiple	  imputation	  is	  used	  as	  an	  SDL	  technique	  with	  sensitive	  data.	  The	  
authors	  use	  Census	  data	  to	  demonstrate	  this	  technique.	  This	  is	  a	  good	  method	  if	  the	  sample	  
size	  is	  sufficient	  to	  support	  the	  imputations.	  	  	  
	  
Under	  the	  new	  model,	  questions	  such	  as	  sample	  size	  and	  the	  disclosure	  risk	  created	  by	  record	  
and	  variable	  uniqueness	  are	  considered	  during	  the	  design	  stage.	  If	  it	  is	  determined	  that	  a	  given	  
sample	  size	  (or	  methodology)	  is	  required	  in	  order	  for	  a	  sensitive	  variable	  or	  response	  category	  
to	  remain	  on	  the	  PUF,	  and	  this	  is	  important	  to	  the	  funder	  or	  investigator,	  the	  sampling	  plan	  can	  
be	  adjusted.	  That	  is,	  the	  sample	  can	  be	  adjusted	  to	  ensure	  that	  enough	  respondents	  populate	  
additional	  cells	  based	  on	  a	  preliminary	  analysis	  of	  disclosure	  risk.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  it	  is	  determined	  that	  a	  sufficient	  sample	  size	  will	  not	  be	  achieved	  to	  allow	  
the	  sensitive	  variable	  or	  response	  code	  to	  be	  released	  in	  a	  PUF,	  or	  this	  will	  be	  too	  costly,	  the	  
funder	  or	  investigator	  may	  decide	  to	  funnel	  resources	  in	  other	  ways.	  For	  a	  repeated	  survey,	  
given	  questions	  or	  response	  categories	  can	  be	  used	  in	  one	  year	  (with	  an	  increased	  sample)	  and	  
alternative	  questions	  asked	  in	  a	  different	  year.	  	  	  
	  
If	  the	  survey	  proceeds	  and	  the	  sensitive	  variable	  will	  not	  be	  released	  on	  the	  PUF	  and	  the	  
variable	  is	  important	  for	  analysis	  (e.g.,	  9/11	  variables,	  period	  of	  military	  service)	  plans	  can	  be	  
made	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  survey	  for	  how	  to	  release	  the	  data,	  such	  as	  through	  a	  restricted	  
online	  data	  analysis	  system	  or	  data	  portal.	  At	  a	  minimum,	  more	  fully	  developed	  dissemination	  
plans	  than	  are	  currently	  envisioned	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  data	  collection	  can	  be	  constructed.	  	  
	  
Identify	  SDL	  techniques	  
	  
The	  last	  step	  in	  the	  early	  disclosure	  analysis	  process	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  SDL	  techniques	  that	  are	  
likely	  to	  be	  used	  with	  the	  final	  data	  file.	  For	  example,	  a	  data	  swapping	  technique	  can	  be	  tested	  
with	  early	  data	  to	  determine	  whether	  it	  appears	  that	  matches	  will	  be	  found	  for	  records	  to	  be	  
swapped	  within	  the	  planned	  parameters.	  This	  allows	  for	  the	  method(s)	  to	  be	  tested	  with	  early	  
data	  and	  if	  necessary,	  adjusted	  prior	  the	  close	  of	  data	  collection	  and	  cleaning.	  Algorithms	  for	  
SDL	  and	  testing	  could,	  in	  fact,	  flow	  from	  the	  cleaning	  and	  editing	  processes.	  This	  will	  further	  
shorten	  the	  time	  to	  data	  release.	  Identifying	  the	  SDL	  methods	  early	  will	  help	  ensure	  that	  the	  
most	  efficient	  methods	  will	  be	  used	  based	  on	  the	  data	  type	  and	  key	  uses	  of	  the	  data.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2	  shows	  the	  steps	  in	  the	  model	  for	  early	  identification	  of	  disclosure	  risks,	  including	  
delineating	  the	  products	  that	  will	  be	  released.	  Planning	  publications,	  tables,	  and	  other	  types	  of	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releases	  helps	  to	  both	  ensure	  human	  subjects	  protection	  and	  that	  the	  most	  utility	  will	  be	  
realized	  from	  the	  data.	  Considering	  all	  types	  of	  releases	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  survey	  
process	  will	  minimize	  inadvertent	  errors.	  	  
	  







Best	  practices	  	  
	  
Implications	  for	  best	  practice	  are	  multi-­‐tiered,	  as	  they	  impact	  several	  aspects	  of	  the	  survey	  
process.	  Moving	  the	  initial	  disclosure	  assessment	  to	  the	  survey	  design	  stage	  may	  require	  survey	  
sample	  and	  design	  modifications	  based	  on	  the	  disclosure	  risk	  that	  is	  revealed.	  Examples	  of	  
these	  possible	  modifications	  will	  include	  whether	  or	  not	  to:	  
	  
• Increase	  the	  sample	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  certain	  questions	  on	  the	  PUF	  or	  utilize	  a	  given	  SDL	  
(e.g.,	  data	  swapping	  vs.	  coarsening);	  
• Eliminate	  certain	  questions	  from	  the	  survey	  (e.g.,	  highly	  detailed	  ethnicity)	  because	  they	  
will	  not	  be	  retained	  on	  the	  PUF	  and	  redirect	  resources	  accordingly;	  conceivably	  and	  
depending	  on	  other	  risks	  and	  issues,	  this	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  suggested	  overall	  decrease	  in	  
sample	  size;	  	  
• Ask	  certain	  questions	  less	  frequently	  (e.g.,	  biennially)	  in	  repeated	  surveys	  to	  better	  
utilize	  resources,	  depending	  on	  the	  analytic	  goals	  of	  the	  survey	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  
the	  PUF	  relative	  to	  other	  goals.	  	  
To	  fully	  achieve	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  model,	  cooperation	  is	  required	  by	  investigators,	  data	  
collectors,	  funding	  agencies,	  and	  data	  distributors.	  Better	  planning	  is	  also	  required	  to	  build	  
funding	  for	  consulting	  regarding	  disclosure	  risk	  analysis	  into	  proposals,	  and	  even	  Requests	  for	  
Proposals	  (RFPs),	  and	  also	  for	  making	  time	  for	  the	  work	  described	  in	  the	  front-­‐end	  of	  the	  design	  
process	  and	  then	  again,	  though	  more	  modestly,	  at	  the	  data	  release	  stage.	  This	  goes	  beyond	  
planning	  for	  data	  dissemination	  alone	  and	  requires	  incorporating	  strategies	  for	  the	  PUF	  and	  
data	  dissemination	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  survey	  process.	  If	  distribution	  will	  involve	  a	  new	  
organization,	  it	  will	  also	  be	  necessary	  to	  bring	  that	  organization	  into	  discussions	  early.	  	  
	  
Including	  disclosure	  risk	  as	  part	  of	  the	  planning	  process	  may	  or	  may	  not	  change	  the	  questions	  
asked	  in	  a	  survey.	  Federal	  law	  mandates	  some	  questions	  in	  surveys	  sponsored	  by	  government	  
agencies,	  such	  as	  those	  that	  produce	  certain	  components	  of	  economic	  forecasts	  and	  national	  
estimates	  of	  crime	  victimization	  or	  child	  abuse.	  However,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  considering	  disclosure	  
risk	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  survey	  process	  will	  make	  dissemination	  more	  efficient	  and	  allow	  for	  
a	  smoother	  and	  faster	  data	  release.	  These	  changes	  will	  not	  only	  help	  create	  a	  more	  useful	  PUF	  
but	  will	  help	  agencies,	  data	  collection	  organizations,	  investigators,	  and	  data	  disseminators	  
create	  the	  strongest	  data	  dissemination	  plans	  possible,	  which	  will	  ultimately,	  speed	  the	  release	  
of	  data	  products,	  and	  help	  ensure	  better	  human	  subjects	  protections,	  and	  more	  timely	  use	  of	  
survey	  results.	  
	  
To	  address	  the	  need	  for	  researchers	  and	  others	  who	  will	  want	  to	  know	  about	  modifications	  to	  
data,	  changes	  from	  the	  original,	  restricted-­‐use	  version	  should	  be	  documented	  in	  codebooks	  or	  
other	  permanent	  texts	  accompanying	  a	  data	  collection.	  In	  this	  way,	  users	  can	  electronically	  
search	  changes.	  The	  changes	  based	  on	  disclosure	  protections	  should	  summarize	  adjustments	  
affecting	  key	  analyses	  so	  that	  researchers	  are	  aware	  of	  these	  modifications.	  Confidential	  
changes	  to	  the	  data	  based	  on	  the	  disclosure	  protection	  that	  would	  put	  the	  plan	  at	  risk	  (e.g.,	  the	  
p-­‐value	  for	  records	  that	  are	  exchanged	  with	  a	  data	  swapping	  technique)	  can	  be	  preserved	  in	  a	  




Research	  agenda	  	  
	  
As	  the	  model	  is	  put	  into	  practice	  and	  information	  is	  shared	  via	  conferences	  and	  publications,	  
refinements	  can	  be	  made.	  Distinctions	  and	  particular	  challenges	  for	  different	  types	  of	  data	  will	  
emerge.	  For	  example,	  longitudinal	  data	  carry	  increased	  risk	  because	  they	  have	  more	  data	  
points	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time	  about	  the	  same	  subject.	  It	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  ensure	  that	  
longitudinal	  data	  are	  considered	  at	  the	  time	  of	  disclosure	  analysis	  and	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  survey	  
design	  due	  to	  (a)	  the	  desire	  to	  release	  early	  waves	  of	  data	  and	  publications	  prior	  to	  all	  data	  
collection	  being	  completed	  and	  (b)	  changes	  that	  may	  be	  made	  to	  later	  waves	  of	  the	  survey.	  
Efficiencies	  that	  were	  gained	  from	  the	  model	  will	  also	  be	  important	  to	  share	  and	  discuss	  so	  that	  
these	  can	  be	  capitalized.	  	  
	  
The	  increasing	  availability	  of,	  and	  demand	  for,	  image	  data,	  such	  as	  biomedical	  scans,	  and	  video	  
data	  underscores	  the	  need	  to	  consider	  disclosure	  risk	  early.	  These	  types	  of	  data,	  compared	  to	  
numerically	  coded	  data,	  have	  more	  risk	  because	  they	  more	  uniquely	  identify	  individuals,	  and	  
they	  do	  so	  with	  a	  single	  “variable”	  (image),	  and	  they	  are	  highly	  sensitive.	  	  
	  
Moving	  disclosure	  considerations	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  survey	  process	  will	  heighten	  
awareness	  regarding	  disclosure	  risk,	  as	  well	  as	  force	  consideration	  of	  all	  data	  releases	  for	  a	  
given	  data	  collection.	  The	  result	  will	  enhance	  the	  ability	  to	  identify	  disclosure	  risks	  for	  all	  data	  
products.	  	  
	  
Educational	  implications	  	  
	  
A	  basic	  and	  continuing	  educational	  implication	  is	  better	  preparation	  of	  graduate	  students	  in	  
disclosure	  risk	  and	  disclosure	  analysis,	  including	  disclosure	  protection	  methods.	  The	  concept	  of	  
disclosure	  risk	  and	  researcher	  responsibilities	  needs	  to	  be	  integrated	  into	  graduate	  education.	  	  
Another	  implication	  is	  post-­‐graduate	  training	  in	  disclosure	  analysis	  and	  SDL	  methods.	  Training	  is	  
particularly	  important	  for	  non-­‐statisticians	  so	  that	  social	  scientists	  engaged	  in	  human	  research,	  
not	  only	  become	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  issues	  of	  disclosure	  risk	  but	  also	  understand	  steps	  to	  take	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